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Internet of Things networks represent an emerging phenomenon bringing connectivity to common sensors. Due to the limited
capabilities and to the sensitive nature of the devices, security assumes a crucial and primary role. In this paper, we report an
innovative and extremely dangerous threat targeting IoT networks. The attack is based on Remote AT Commands exploitation,
providing a malicious user with the possibility of reconfiguring or disconnecting IoT sensors from the network. We present the
proposed attack and evaluate its efficiency by executing tests on a real IoT network. Results demonstrate how the threat can be
successfully executed and how it is able to focus on the targeted nodes, without affecting other nodes of the network.
1. Introduction
The Internet is today adopted for a wide range of different
purposes and by several kinds of entities, ranging from
banking and stock market sectors adoption to personal
use for social networking and web surfing. The Internet is
indeed populated by billions of devices of different nature.
In the last years, we have seen the appearance of several
categories of always connected devices: smartphones, tablets,
smartwatches, and healthcare devices are today only a few
kinds of components of the global network. We are today
experiencing a new emerging trend related to the evolution
of common “analog” sensors, making them connect to each
other, creating a “parallel” network based on machine-to-
machine communications.
In this context, the term Internet of Things (IoT) rep-
resents a general concept relative to the ability of common
sensors to collect data from the real world and hence share
the retrieved information across a network, by commu-
nicating with other connected devices. IoT networks are
today deployed for different purposes. The most known
and adopted ones are the home automation/domotics and
the industrial (Industry 4.0) contexts: while in a domotic
context IoT networks are used to provide connectivity to
common and security devices (light bulbs, internal cam-
eras, fire sensors, etc.), in an Industry 4.0 scenario, IoT is
used to monitor, control, inform, and automate production
processes. In order to communicate on the network, IoT
devices support different communication protocols, such as
Industrial Ethernet [1],Wi-Fi [2], ZigBee [3], and Z-Wave [4].
Our research, presented in this paper, investigates secu-
rity aspects of IoT networks. We focus on ZigBee, a com-
munication protocol ensuring low power consumption and
characterized by low data transmission rates. During our
study, we found important security issues related to a ZigBee
based system and, potentially, to other IoT protocols. We
identified the possibility of sending Remote AT Commands,
where AT means “attention,” to a connected sensor, in order
to reconfigure the device, for instance, by making it join
a different malicious network and hence forward captured
data to the enemy. We evaluate the possibility of perpetrat-
ing a successful attack by setting up a network laboratory
composed of XBee devices (XBee is one of the most adopted
ZigBee radio modules in the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) scenario
[5]). We describe the exposure to Remote AT Commands
threats by focusing on evaluating efficiency and performance
characteristics of this innovative attack.
The focus of our work is on the proposal of an innovative
cyberattack. This may result in an unconventional and not
needed activity. Nevertheless, especially in the research field,
it is well known that offence research is as needed as defense
research, in order to properlymaster a field and better prepare
to counter cyber-criminal activities [6, 7].
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The remaining of the paper focuses on the presentation
of the innovative discovered threat and it is structured
as follows. Section 2 reports the structure of the ZigBee
protocol. Section 3 reports related work on the topic, while
Section 4 reports our contribution on Remote AT Command
exploitation. Then, Section 5 exposes the adopted testbed
and obtained results by executing the attack on a controlled
environment. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and
reports possible extensions of the work.
2. The ZigBee Protocol
ZigBee is a wireless standard introduced by the ZigBee
Alliance in 2004. It is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard,
used in the Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN)
context [8]. ZigBee is designed for embedded systems, often
characterized by extremely low power consumption and low-
rate transfers requirements [9]. The protocol is indeed able
to minimize battery replacement frequency (up to 2 years)
and to provide a communication rate up to 250 kbps, for a
coverage radius up to 1000meters. Figure 1 depicts the ZigBee
stack protocol.
The physical layer of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard manages
modulation and demodulation operations. Particularly, Zig-
Bee supports three different frequencies:
(i) 2.4GHz with support to 16 different channels, pro-
viding a maximum communication rate of 250 kbps
(used worldwide)
(ii) 868MHz with support to 1 channel and a maximum
data rate of 20 kbps (used in Europe)
(iii) 915MHz with support to 10 channels and 40 kbps of
communication rate (used in US)
Since they work on the same frequency, in case of 2.4GHz
adoption, there may be interferences with existent Wi-Fi
networks [10].
TheMAC layer, also implemented in IEEE 802.15.4, takes
care of ensuring a reliable and secure communication, by
implementing a Carrier SenseMultiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) to control access to the physical level
[11].
The network layer of the ZigBee protocol implements
instead network topologies, new devices management, and
security handling. Particularly, ZigBee supports three differ-
ent network topologies:
(i) A star topology, where each node communicates with
a central node
(ii) A tree topology, where central nodes of different
networks are connected with a bus network
(iii) A mesh topology, where all the nodes are connected
to each other
Mesh networks are the most interesting ones: in this case,
ZigBee implements ad hoc routing algorithms to automati-
cally rearrange communications if a node of the network is
disconnected [12].
The Application Framework layer represents the user
interface and it is composed of three main components:
Physical layer (PHY)
Medium access control (MAC)
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Figure 1: The ZigBee stack protocol.
(i) Application Support Sublayer (APS), providing an
interface between network and application layers;
moreover, it controls and manages data sent and
received by other protocol layers to ensure proper
packet transmission and encryption
(ii) ZigBee Device Objects (ZDO), an application object
responsible for the initialization procedures of the
APS and the ZigBee network layer to perform discov-
ery of services and new nodes in the network
(iii) Application Framework (AF), an execution environ-
ment for “application objects,” each ones identified by
an endpoint address from 1 to 254 (0 is reserved for
ZigBee Device Object (ZDO), 255 for broadcast mes-
sages): application objects are usually implemented by
differentmanufacturers. In order to enhance products
interoperability, the ZigBee Alliance has published
different application profiles.Themost common ones
are home automation, smart energy, light link, and
green power [8]
2.1. ZigBee Node Types. ZigBee supports different kind of
devices with different functionalities:
(i) ZigBee end-device (ZED): it represents the sensor,
usually in sleep mode most of the time and period-
ically waking up in order to communicate with the
other nodes of the network.
(ii) ZigBee router (ZR): it is an optional node used to
route packets on the network.
(iii) ZigBee coordinator (ZC): it is a ZigBee router with
gateway functions used to manage the network.
While on the same network it is common to have
several different ZED nodes and different routers, a single
coordinator is found.
2.2. ZigBee Security. As many other wireless networks, like
Wi-Fi [13] or ad hoc wireless sensor network [14, 15], security
assumes a crucial role in the ZigBee protocol.The encryption
algorithm used in ZigBee is Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) with a 128-bit key. Such algorithm, considered
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extremely secure and reliable, guarantees confidentiality and
authenticity on wireless communications [16].
ZigBee provides two different security profiles [17]:
Standard Security, the basic security profile, rarely adopted
because of its exposure to attacks, and High Security, mostly
used since it guarantees greater security during communi-
cations. Particularly, while considering the standard security
profile, the network key is shared in clear text (unencrypted),
it is encryptedwith the link key in case of high security profile
adoption. The link key is one of the security keys adopted by
ZigBee:
(i) Master key is usually hardcoded on the device or
shared out-of-band. It is needed in order to retrieve
the other keys but it is never directly sent on the
network.
(ii) Network key is a key shared by all the devices
connected to the same network. It is generated by the
Trust Center and it can be sent on the network as plain
text or in encrypted form, depending on the adopted
security profile.
(iii) Link key is a key generated using the master key and
adopted for communications between two different
devices on the same network.
In a ZigBee network, if communication is unencrypted,
an attacker may access all information of the network and
may even sniff/capture exchanged packets. Otherwise, if
communication is encrypted, a malicious user may only
perform attacks that do not require access to the network,
such as denial of service or jamming, since it is very difficult
to retrieve the ZigBee adopted network key and hence
decrypt exchanged packets.
3. Related Work
Because of the wide adoption of the ZigBee protocol, one
of the most important concerns is related to ZigBee based
networks protection. Many security experts have studied
the protocol and identified several threats able to target
such systems. In this context, an important contribution is
provided by Wright, the creator of Killerbee, a framework
including a set of tools able to exploit the ZigBee protocol
analyzing network traffic and processing the recovered pack-
ets [18]. Although such software is extremely dangerous, its
specific hardware requirements (such as Atmel AVR USB
Stick or TelosB mote models) limit the execution of properly
equipped attackers. Thanks to Killerbee, it is possible to
execute several attacks against a ZigBee network: for instance,
it is possible to retrieve the network key when sent as clear
text. Such retrieval requires the attacker to be located in
proximity of the network nodes, in order to sniff the key
exchange. Killerbee also includes other threats such as replay
[19] or manipulation/injection [20].
Other attacks focus on denial of service (DoS) activities,
executed in order to disconnect a node from the network.
DoS attacks are popular on the Internet [7] and they are
extending to last generation fields such as mobile [21],
SDN [22], and IoT [23]. Considering such kind of threats
perpetrated against a ZigBee system, several attacks target
battery powered sensors in order to reduce the lifetime of
the device. In this context, the ZigBee end-device sabotage
attack [24] is executed by keeping sensors active when a
broadcast message is sent every time the device wakes up
from the sleep status. In this way, a sensor under attack is
forced to reply the malicious user, hence delaying the next
sleep and discharging the batteries quickly. A similar threat,
the ghost attack proposed by Shila, reduces the lifetime of
the targeted device by sending several crafted bogusmessages
to the victim [25]. Vidgren et al. demonstrate instead how
it is possible to discharge the batteries of a sensor if the
attacker knows the adopted sensor polling rate [26]. Pacheco
et al. investigate instead DDoS attacks feasibility against IoT
environments [27]. Another DoS attack proposed by Vidgren
et al. exploits the ZigBee frame counter. Such counter is
commonly used by different network protocols to prevent
threats such as replay attacks. Concerning ZigBee frame
counter exploitation, amalicious user could send a parameter
containing the maximum allowed frame counter value (sized
4 bytes), hence forcing the victim to set the counter to
the received value. If Message Integrity Check [28] is not
implemented by the victim, each packet received after the
malicious one will be discarded by the victim since it will
present a lower frame counter [26].
Another attack, known as same-nonce attack [29], can
be carried out only if the Trust Center, a device providing
reliability during the key exchange stage, provides the same-
nonce encrypt with the same network key for two consecutive
times. In a ZigBee network, coordinators have role of Trust
Center. In this scenario, an attacker may retrieve part of the
plain text simply calculating the XORbetween the two sniffed
packets. Although this situation rarely happens, it is possible
to force this behavior by causing a power failure, for example,
by discharging batteries of a Trust Center. In this case, Trust
Center resets the nonce to its default value and it is possible
to send a packet with the same nonce [26].
Considering other threats, ZigBee networks are also
vulnerable to attacks known as Sinkhole andWormhole, pro-
posed by Karnain and Zakaria [30]. During a Sinkhole attack,
a malicious node attracts the network packets with the aim
of creating confusion in the routing phase. Instead, during a
Wormhole attack, the malicious user receives packets at one
point in the network and then replays these packets in other
areas to interfere with all network functionality. Also, while
Krivtsova et al. propose the broadcast storm attack clogging
the network by sending numerous broadcast packets [31],
Yang et al. introduced two attacks against ZigBee, known
as Absolute Slot Number (ASN) and time synchronization
tree attack. Considering that the time is split into different
slots/ASNs of fixed length, during an ASN attack, since cur-
rent ASN value is sent during communication, the legitimate
nodes may get an incorrect ASN value from the attacker that
sends on the network a broadcast message with a wrong ASN
value. In this way, a node would not be able to communicate
on the network since the wrong ASN packet would lead to
a communication interruption. In time synchronization tree
attack, the malicious user may send bogus DAG Information
Objects (DIO) packets [32] to the neighbors with the aim of
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desynchronizing their connections with the network [32]. A
Sybil attack, proposed by Lee et al., is launched by an attacker
that acquires multiple identities on the network. The aim of
this attack is to convince the other devices that the malicious
node is a legitimate node. In this way, a malicious node may,
for example, access all services of the network or identify itself
as a ZigBee router [33]. Another type of attack is performed
if the enemy can physically access a ZigBee device. Indeed,
the malicious user may perform a firmware dump in order to
extrapolate the network key stored/hardcoded in the device
[34].
Other attacks focus instead on specific version of ZigBee.
In this context, a particular version of the ZigBee protocol,
called ZigBee Light Link, used, for instance, by Philips Hue
bulbs [35], has been exploited different times. Indeed, Gent
found that the adopted ZigBee network key can be retrieved if
an attacker can sniff the reinitialization process accomplished
by the bulbs after a reset and if he knows the ZigBee Light
Link master key [36]. Another attack on ZigBee Light Link is
proposed by Ronen et al., creating a worm that automatically
infects adjacent bulbs, building a custom infected firmware,
and being deployed as a fake OTA update [37].
Many works focus instead on ZigBee protection. For
instance, a solution to detect the Sybil attack is proposed
by Marian and Mircea, presenting an interesting protection
system using RSSI derived metrics to detect a Sybil attack by
computing the location of a node and then classifying it as
malicious or not [38]. Al Baalbaki et al. introduced instead
anAnomaly BehaviorAnalysis System (ABAS) for the ZigBee
protocol based on network traffic analysis. After detection is
triggered, ABAS can classify the attack as known or unknown
using information like packets origin or destination [39].
Another protection algorithm proposed by Jokar and Leung
and known as HANIDPS implements machine learning
based intrusion detection and prevention system. HANIDPS
analyzes the network traffic and compares it with a normal
in order to detect a running threat [40]. A similar approach
may analyze energy consumption [41] to identify running
attacks. Cui et al. proposed instead a fuzzing method based
on finite state machines. A fuzzy test is implemented by
injecting different testing cases into the system in order to
detect vulnerabilities [42]. A defense against impulsive noise
is proposed by Jia and Meng, implementing a system using a
noise filtering processing activity in two steps: while during
the first step an estimate of the noise is computed, in the
second one, a noise cancellation is accomplished, in order to
state if the estimate is suspect or not [43].
During our research work, we have studied security
aspects of ZigBee based IoT networks by initially studying
the protocol, thus analyzing the major threats affecting it,
hence studying possible protection systems and approaches.
During our study, we have discovered the proposed threat
and, to the best of our knowledge, we noticed that a vulner-
ability analysis focused on AT Command exploitation is still
missing.Nevertheless, this vulnerability should be considered
extremely innovative and particularly dangerous, since it
allows malicious users to retrieve/forward sensitive informa-
tion or manipulate nodes functionality. Our work focuses on
the proposal of the innovative Remote AT Command attack,
explained in the next section, by illustrating the proposed
threat and evaluating its efficiency.
4. Remote Control Exploitability
In order to properly investigate ZigBee security, we have
studied the protocol and analyzed communication flows,
considering the different types of packets supported by
ZigBee.While, at first, we focused on packets containing data
sent from the coordinator to the end-device, later, we have
also analyzed other packets exchanged in the network. In this
context, we found that, at the MAC layer, it is possible to
send Remote AT Commands. By working at such lower layer,
received packets are not processed at the application layer;
hence, it may not be possible to access the packet content to
avoid interpretation, except from the device manufacturer.
During our research work, we identified a particular
vulnerability affecting AT Commands capabilities imple-
mented in IoT sensor networks. Our work focuses on the
exploitation of such weakness. AT Commands are specific
packets, historically adopted by old generation modems to
interfacewith the device, today used by radiomodules such as
XBee [44], ESP8266 (more information is available at http://
esatjournals.net/ijret/2017v06/i01/IJRET20170601027.pdf), or
ETRX3 [45] to configure parameters like connection type,
network identifier, device name on the network, or destina-
tion address for a communication. AT Commands are today
supported by many devices of different nature, providing
different functionalities and hence commands. For instance,
modules that provide connectivity support AT Command
packets for network parameters configuration, while other
modules may use these packets to alter light intensity of light
bulbs.
For our research, as previously mentioned, we focused
on XBee modules. Such modules, widely adopted around the
world, especially in DIY contexts, implement two different
AT Command packets, related to request and response
operations, respectively. Concerning XBee modules, these
packets can be sent remotely: we talk in this case of Remote
AT Commands. Such packets belong to the (IEEE 802.15.4)
MAC layer and they are interpreted by the (XBee) mod-
ule automatically. Therefore, by being such interpretation
demanded to the device firmware, and being such firmware
provided by the manufacturer, Digi International, it is not
possible to avoid implicit Remote AT Commands interpre-
tation. In order to execute the proposed attack, the AT
Command functionality of XBee has to be exploited. XBee
supports several AT Command packets (more information is
available at https://www.sparkfun.com/datasheets/Wireless/
Zigbee/XBee-Datasheet.pdf). Particularly, for our aim, we
have used ATID commands to target sensors (in general,
other commands/approaches may be used for different pur-
poses: e.g., to make the sensor join a different network, to
forward (sensitive) data to a different malicious receiver, and
to disable data encryption). ATID is used by XBee modules
to set the network identifier. During the proposed RemoteAT
Command attack, the malicious user sends an ATID packet
with a bogus identifier in order to make it join a different
(inexistent, in our case) network.
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In order tomaliciously exploit RemoteATCommand, it is
assumed that the attacker is connected to the network of the
target. In this case, the enemy may, for instance, disconnect
an end-device from the ZigBee network and make it join a
different (malicious) network and hence forward potentially
sensitive data to third malicious parties. Given the nature
of IoT end-devices, often associated with a critical data and
operations, it may be obvious how a Remote AT Command
attack represents a serious threat for the entire infrastructure.
5. Testbed
In this section, we report information about the tests we have
conducted in order to validate the success and the efficiency
of a Remote AT Command attack. In order to accomplish
the tests, we have built a ZigBee test network, depicted in
Figure 2.
The network is composed of a single ZigBee coordinator,
two end-devices representing common sensors on the net-
work, and a malicious user/node connected to the ZigBee
network. As can be deduced from the figure, the attacker
sends Remote AT Command packets only to one sensor and
not to each device on the network. This implementation
allows us to monitor the effects of the attack on the two
sensors, hence evaluating the possibility of carrying out a
successful attack without affecting targeted nodes. Indeed, we
expect that, during a Remote AT Command attack, only the
targeted sensor is affected by the threat, while other nodes
keep working correctly (unless their behavior depends on the
targeted sensor).
Considering the described scenario, we will now detail
at first adopted hardware, hence reporting information about
testbed configuration, finally exposing the obtained results.
5.1. Testbed Configuration. Different devices have been used
to create ZigBee network to implement ATCommand attack.
For our aim, network components are composed as reported
in the following:
(i) Coordinator, composed of a Raspberry Pi 3 equipped
with an XBee USB Board and an XBee Series 2
(ii) Targeted sensor, composed of an Arduino UNO R3,
equipped with an XBee Shield and an XBee Series 2
(iii) Not targeted sensor, composed of an Arduino UNO
R3, equipped with an XBee Shield and an XBee Series
2
(iv) Attacker, composed of a Raspberry Pi 3 equippedwith
an XBee USB Board and an XBee Series 2
As the reader may notice, end-devices/sensors share
the same hardware. Hence, our evaluation allows us to
identify the efficiency of the attack on the targeted node, and
simultaneously the possibility of avoiding side effects on other
nodes (this is not possible, e.g., for jamming attacks).
Moreover, since XBee series 2 modules have low com-
putational capacity, we adopted Arduino microcontrollers
to generate and elaborate information, hence using XBee
modules only for network communications. In order to
guarantee the sleep status of end-devices, a PIN Hibernation
has been implemented [46] by connecting the 7th PIN
of the XBee Shield to an Arduino digital PIN. In order
to implement PIN Hibernation, 𝐷7 value, a PIN used to
send and receive serial data, has been disabled (through
XCTU XBee programming software). In order to test this
vulnerability, the innovative attack is implemented and tested
with this configuration: the attackwas performed on only one
sensor because by monitoring the network traffic is possible
to verify the efficiency of this threat.
5.2. Network Nodes Implementation. Every 35 seconds, sen-
sors are programmed to send a packet to the coordinator.
Each packet contains a random generated number. After the
message has been sent, the sensor device enters in sleepmode
in order to reduce power consumption. Since the content of
the message is not meaningful to us, the “random number”
solution allows us to generate data to be transmitted on the
network without requiring environmental sensors.
Figures 3 and 4 monitor the network traffic of the various
XBee modules. Although we stated that a single packet is
sent every 35 seconds, sending is relative to application layer
packets, while the capture is relative to the entire ZigBee net-
work stack. Although such capture includes additional (lower
layers) packets (including, for instance, wake-up commands
containing network node information and synchronization
packets), it is representative of the network behavior of the
sensor (e.g., we can see that, after the attack, no packets
are sent by the victim node), while a capture focused on
application layer packets/messages would produce single
peaks missing useful information.
Data is received by the coordinator and shown to the user
through an HTML based graphical interface, also reporting
if sensors are correctly communicating with the coordina-
tor. This environment is representative of a wide range of
network types. For instance, sensors installed on a specific
area/farm/company could be monitored through a similar
approach, or industry machines and fire prevention systems
may be part of a network system similar to the proposed one.
6. Results
Network traffic was analyzed from an external ZigBee device
capturing data on the same channel used by the targeted
network. From sniffed traffic, we are able to extrapolate
communication flows of single hosts of the network.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) report the network traffic flow of
both targeted and not targeted sensors during a running
attack. Traffic was monitored for 120 seconds and it is split
into two phases: during the first 50 seconds, the attacker acts
in a “passive” way, by scanning the ZigBee spectrum in order
to identify the devices connected to the network and define
the target. Instead, on the second “active” phase, the attacker
sends Remote AT Command packets to the targeted sensor
in order to perform the attack. Particularly, for our aim, the
passive behavior is not intended as a “listen only” behavior.
Instead, during this phase, the attacker does not send any
malicious packet on the network. Therefore, we expect that
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(b) Traffic generated by not targeted sensor
Figure 3: Network traffic captured during attack execution.
detecting a malicious behavior during the passive phase is
particularly difficult.
Figure 3(a) reports the traffic flow of the targeted sensor.
By analyzing the graph, it is possible to notice that while the
sensor is correctly working during the passive phase, a few
seconds after the attack is (actively) performed, the device
is disconnected from the network and its communication
with the coordinator is interrupted. Therefore, the attack is
successful on the targeted sensor.
Instead, Figure 3(b) reports the status of the nontar-
geted sensor during the attack. Particularly, it is possible
to notice that the connection is maintained alive for the
entire considered period. Indeed, since this sensor is not
directly targeted by the attacker, Remote AT Commands are
not received/interpreted; hence, the network parameters of
the sensor are not altered by the attacker and communi-
cation capability of the sensor is maintained and not even
disturbed. This represents an important characteristic of the
proposed threat, since it is able to only affect the targeted
device, by making the attack not directly visible to the other
sensors/devices. Such stealth behavior makes the attack more
difficult to detect. Moreover, considering that device commu-
nication interruption may be related to external factors (e.g.,
battery drain, wireless noise, andmalfunctioning device), the
proposed attack should be considered a serious threat.
Figure 4 shows instead the captured attack traffic during
the considered period.
By analyzing the passive phase of the attack, as previously
mentioned, the enemy performs a scan of the network in
order to identify each device connected to the network
and choose the targeted device. Instead in the active attack
phase, Remote AT Command packets are sent to the targeted
sensor with the aim of disconnecting it from the network
(by reconfiguring it). If we analyze the attack traffic flow, it
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Figure 4: Traffic generated by attacker sensor.
is very difficult to distinguish a passive (hence, potentially
legitimate) behavior from an active (malicious) one. Hence,
detection of a running threat may require packet inspection
or data flows interpretation (not easy to accomplish in case of
encrypted traffic).
Although our testbed focuses on two network sen-
sors/devices, the proposed Remote AT Commands attack is
particularly scalable, due to the (minimum) requirements
for the attacker (a single packet is sent to the victim to
reconfigure it). Particularly, the time required to send such
packet is minimal, so in case of multiple targeted sensors, the
attack success is guaranteed. Of course, in case of extremely
large amounts of targeted sensors, the effectiveness of the
attack depends on the scan time: the attack is successful if
the minimum “sleep time” of each sensor is larger than the
average time required to target all the sensors.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed paper is focused on Internet of Things (IoT)
environments security, by analyzing the possibility of carry-
ing out a successful attack against a targeted node/sensor/
device. During our work, we found a novel vulnerability
affecting IoT devices: by exploiting a particular type of
packet, Remote AT Command, it is possible to remotely
reconfigure/program network nodes as the attacker wishes,
hence compromising data communication security of the
network.
By focusing on the ZigBee (wireless) protocol, we have
described and implemented the proposed attack with the
aim of interrupting the communication capabilities of a
targeted device of the network. For our tests, we targeted
XBeemodules [44], able to communicate through the ZigBee
protocol. Results show that the attack is successful and it is
able to target a single node without affecting the other nodes
of the network. Moreover, since the number of packets sent
by the attacker is minimum, it is not easy to detect a running
attack, without doing deep packet inspection. The attack is
therefore particularly dangerous, since it may compromise
the security of an IoT network with minimum effort for the
attacker. By comparing the effects of the proposed attack to
other network based threats, they can be assimilated to denial
of service, man-in-the-middle (traffic sniffing), or traffic
redirection activities, in function of the strategy adopted by
the attacker.
Future work on the topic may concern additional tests
of the attack in large scale networks composed of different
nodes, in order to identify the limits of the threat, in
function of the sleeping/polling times adopted by the nodes.
Considering instead the design of defense systems, additional
extensions of theworkmay be directed to the implementation
of efficient protection techniques able to defend an IoT
system from a Remote AT Command attack. Since detection
of a running threat may not be immediate, in order to protect
a remote device from a Remote AT Command attack, it may
be preferred to directly work on the (potentially vulnerable)
nodes. In this context, three different approaches can be
adopted, working at different levels:
(i) Firmware level: creation of a modified version of
the firmware, implementing Remote AT Commands
filtering or allowingATCommands elaboration at the
application layer
(ii) Device configuration level: providing to the user the
ability to configure a device with disabled support to
Remote AT Commands
(iii) External level: demanding protection capabilities to
an external application program.
Each approach provides an efficient solution to pro-
tect the device. Nevertheless, some approaches may not
be adopted (e.g., device configuration, if not available).
Suggested implementations provide a possible protection for
this innovative threat.
The first proposed solution (firmware level protection)
requires a device firmware upgrade to allow total AT Com-
mand packet management, such as the ability to process
only packets received by the coordinator or secure devices.
Such solution would provide the user with the possibility of
configuring the device in order to avoid implicit Remote AT
Commands interpretation.
Since modifying a firmware may not be easy, and the
source code must be open source, it is suggested to have
simpler but equally effective solutions. The second solution
(device configuration level protection) implements the ability
to disable Remote AT Command support of the module,
by implementing a specific setting able to disable automatic
Remote AT Command interpretation (e.g., packets discard).
In this way, the proposed threat would be ineffective.
The last proposed solution (external level protection)
is the most interesting; the main purpose is to implement
protection logics on the Arduino device by implementing a
function at application layer. The aim of the function is to
verify if the XBee module may be communicating on the
network. In this case, just before the sensor is ready to com-
municate on the network, an internal check is accomplished.
8 Security and Communication Networks
Although the mentioned approaches may protect IoT
modules and network sensors from this innovative attack, by
ensuring data transmission security, their design implemen-
tation and evaluation are on the scope of further work on the
topic.
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